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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the  determinants  of  the  institutionalisation  of  political  risk  assessment
(IPRA) within publicly  traded  international  firms  in  Jordan.   The  aim  is  to  contribute  to  the
development of IPRA theory by identifying indicators  of  institutionalisation;  by  describing  and
explaining their determinants;  and  by  investigating  their  relative  importance.   The  paper  also
represents one of the first studies of political risk assessment of  firms in a Middle East context.
The study focuses on firm-specific characteristics and extends previous research  by  investigating
firms’  size  and  degree  of   internationalisation.   A   survey   strategy   was   adopted   and   self-
administered  questionnaires  were  distributed  to   the   entire   target   population   of   Jordanian
international firms.  44 usable responses were obtained  (54.9%).   Non-parametric  statistics  were
used to test the research hypotheses.
The main findings are that the level of institutionalisation of PRA within firms is significantly and
positively correlated with a firm’s  total  assets,  international  revenue  and  number  of  operating
countries. Of the three significant determinants  of  institutionalisation,  the  number  of  operating
countries is found to be the most important.  The  more  countries  in  which  a  firm  operates,  the
more likely it is to face significant risks, and so to institutionalise political risk assessment.
THE  INSTITUTIONALISATION  OF   POLITICAL   RISK   ASSESSMENT
(IPRA) IN JORDANIAN INTERNATIONAL FIRMS
1. INTRODUCTION
Political risk is defined as “the possibility that political decisions or political or societal events in a country
will affect the business climate in such a way that investors will lose money or not make as much money as
they expected when the investment was made” (Howell, 2001, p.4).  Political risk  assessment,  meanwhile,
is defined for the purpose of this study as  “the  process  of  analysing  and  evaluating  political  risk  while
undertaking international business  activities”.   Instability  in  the  international  political  environment  has
provided significant  credence  to  the  importance  of  assessing  potential  risks  in  international  business.
International businesses,  thus,  must  assess  the  risks  of  doing  business  in  such  an  environment  since
successful firms are those which  are  sensitive  to  change  in  an  international  context  (Davidson,  1991).
Kobrin (1981a; 1982) and Fitzpatrick (1983) were the first researchers to make the  now  common  division
of political risk into ‘macro’  risks  and  ‘micro’  risks;  a  division  also  supported  by  most  of  the  recent
political risk studies, including Minor (2003), Brink (2004), Hood and Nawaz (2004),  Oetzel  (2005),  Tsai
and Su (2005) and Stosberg (2005). Macro-risk occurs when risks affect all foreign firms (e.g.  revolutions,
coups d’état, civil wars) while ‘micro’ risk occurs when risks are intended to affect only  selected  business
activity (e.g. import or  currency  controls  directed  at  specific  industries).    Specific  projects,  firms  and
industries face distinctly different risks within a given country  and  can  have  widely  varying  impacts  on
firms operating in that environment (Alon et al., 2006).  It is therefore appropriate  to  study  IPRA  from  a
firm-specific characteristics perspective.  
The literature on political risk has suggested that the standard of PRA undertaken by  international
firms  is  generally  low  (Rice  and  Mahmoud,  1990;  Stapenhurst,  1992a;  Stapenhurst,   1992b;
Wyper, 1995; Pahud de Mortanges and Allers, 1996; Burmester, 2000; Hood  and  Nawaz,  2004).
Burmester (2000, p27) goes as far as to suggest that no academic  discussion  of  political  risk  ‘is
complete  without  a  complaint  about  the  generally  low  standard   of   political   risk   analysis’
undertaken by international firms.  This suggests  either a lack  of  awareness  of  political  risk  in
international business participants, resistance by firms to the notion that political risk is  amenable
to analysis or that existing political risk assessment techniques have not worked well for managers
(Cosset and Roy, 1991; Oetzel, et al., 2001)[1].
The political risk literature suggests, however, that  a)  political  risk  is  assessable  and  helps  the
decision-maker to avoid or decrease the chance of both property and income losses by  suggesting
appropriate management tools; b) international firms are aware of their exposure  to  political  risk
and consider political risk  as  one  of  the  most  important  risks  for  their  international  business
activities  (Anchor  et  al.,  2006).   Nevertheless,  the  use  of  PRA  in  practice  is   described   as
‘informal’, ‘unsystematic’, ‘reactive’, ‘inadequate’ or ‘subjective’ in many cases.
In this context, the political risk assessment literature (e.g. Blank et al., 1980; Kobrin et al.,  1980;
Kobrin, 1981; Kobrin, 1982; Hashmi and Baker, 1988;  Wyper,  1995;  Pahud  de  Mortanges  and
Allers, 1996) has used the term “institutionalisation” to  describe  the  process  by  which  political
risk assessment becomes more explicit and systematic within a firm.  This paper will use the  term
“institutionalisation of political risk assessment” (IPRA) to formalise this.
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the development of a theory of  IPRA  by  examining  and
explaining  the  institutionalisation  of  political  risk  assessment   in   publicly   traded   Jordanian
international firms.  This is achieved via pursuit of three  objectives:  a)  to  identify  indicators  of
IPRA; b) to describe and explain the  determinants  of  IPRA;  and  c)  to  investigate  the  relative
importance of, and the correlations among, the determinants of IPRA.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
1. Institutionalisation in Organisations
Organisational  theorists  have  sought  to  explain  the  development  of  routines,  structures   and
processes  in  organisations.   The  behavioural  approach  posits  that  changes   to   organisational
routines  are  triggered  in  response  to  a   failure   to   meet   organisational   aspirations   or   low
performance (Cyert and  March,  1963).   This  approach  considers  that  performance  is  the  key
feedback mechanism which is used to  indicate  success  or  failure:  where  there  is  a  decline  in
performance, a change in the  organisational  procedure  or  routine  is  stimulated.   For  Chandler
(1993), changes in the structure  of  an  organisation  follow  or  result  from  changes  in  strategy;
changes take place when the existing structure becomes dysfunctional and no longer facilitates the
achievement  of  objectives.  Chandler  (1993)  assumed  that   changes   in   strategy   are   caused
ultimately  by  changes  in  a  firm’s  environment,  by  new  opportunities  and  needs  created  by
changing population, income, technology and the like.  Strategy,  structure  and  the  environment,
according to Wheelen and Hunger (2002) and Brink (2004), need to be aligned closely; otherwise,
organisational performance is likely to suffer.
Institutionalisation theory offers an alternative  explanation  of  the  emergence  of  structures  and
routines in organisations.  In this perspective it is observed that firms  in  a  similar  organisational
field model themselves on one another, a phenomenon referred to as isomorphism (Di Maggio and
Powell,  1983).  Organisational  isomorphism  can  stimulated  through  three  processes:  coercive
isomorphism (the use of power and sanctions to bring around organisational conformity), mimetic
isomorphism (where organisations  copy  one  other  in  their  field)  and  normative  isomorphism
(which  is  linked  to   professional   standards   in   the   field)   (DiMaggio   and   Powell,   1983).
Stapenhurst’s (1992b)  reference to the ‘rise and fall’ of the political risk assessment ‘function’  in
the USA in the 1980s suggests a process of organisational mimicry .
In the context of political risk assessment, Kobrin (1982, p.  69)  suggests  that  institutionalisation
of political risk  assessment  requires  “stimulus  exogenous  to  the  process  itself”  and  is  “most
unlikely to arise spontaneously”.  As environments become more turbulent, perceived  uncertainty
increases  (Oetzel,  2005).  Increased  environmental  uncertainty  requires  increased  information
acquisition and processing in relation to the environment (Sarewitz et al., 2003; Xu  et  al.,  2003).
Such information acquisition and processing  is  critical  for  success  in  the  international  market
because  of   the   increasing   level   of   uncertainty   and   complexity   in   firms’   multiple   and
geographically dispersed operating environments. Firms, thus, must adapt to their  environment  if
they are to survive and prosper. Given the complexity of  organisations  and  the  environments  in
which  they  operate,  effective  managers  must  be  sensitive  to  environmental  signals   through
constant assessment (Albright, 2004) which typically comprises political and  societal  assessment
(Brink, 2004). To this end, the ‘institutionalisation’ of PRA can be seen as an ‘adaptive’  response
by firms in circumstances where there is a greater probability that potentially significant risks will
arise from the political environment (Blank et al., 1980; Kobrin, 1982; Stapenhurst, 1992a).
2. Institutionalisation of Political Risk Assessment (IPRA)
The term “institutionalisation”, in  the  context  of  political  risk  assessment,  was  introduced  by
Blank et al. (1980, p7) and is used to describe the process by which PRA becomes  “more  explicit
and  systematic”  within  a  firm.   They  stated  that  in  a  ‘traditional’  firm  there  is   no   formal
assignment of responsibility for PRA nor is any effort made to assess political risk associated with
international business activities. Similarly, Kobrin (1982) suggested that  institutionalisation,  as  a
minimum,  entails  the  specification  of  responsibilities  attached  to  a   position.    However,   he
highlighted that firms may also conduct PRA  but  without  assigning  such  responsibilities  to  an
individual or group. Blank et al.  (1980,  p7)  emphasised  that  “related  activities  are  carried  out
instead by various individuals”, usually “senior managers”  on  a  “need  basis”.  Both  approaches
suggest that: a) PRA begins to be institutionalised when formal responsibility for  its  performance
is assigned to a specific individual or group; b) PRA is further institutionalised  when  the  process
is routinized; and c) in a more institutionalised setting, there  is  a  greater  emphasis  on  objective
assessment in addition to subjective assessment. Indeed, the  Risk  Management  Standard  (2002)
suggests that, for firms to be in compliance, they need to meet the following conditions: they must
conduct risk management ‘in-house’; they must set out responsibilities for risk  management;  and
they must conduct risk management on a continuous basis.
Institutionalisation, according to Blank et al. (1980, p. 7), is a gradual process and there is a ‘grey
area’ in  which  a  particular  firm  may  appear  to  have  institutionalised  the  process  from  one
perspective but not from  another.   Despite  early  work  suggesting  that  institutionalisation  is  a
bipolar continuum  rather  than  a  discrete  or  binary  classification  Kobrin  (1982,  p.  69),  most
subsequent empirical political risk studies have dealt with  institutionalisation  as  binary.  That  is,
such studies, have classified  firms  into  institutionalised  versus  non-institutionalised  and  have
relied on one indicator; either the  existence  of  a  PRA  department  (Pahud  de  Mortanges  and
Allers,  1996),  or  the  tendency  of  firms  to  initiate  the  process  too  late   (Burmester,   2000).
Consequently, one firm cannot be somewhere between these two categories.   This  approach  to
institutionalisation is flawed however because risk management, as noted  by  Hood  and  Nawaz
(2004),  contains  no  implicit  assumption  of  the  need  for  a   specific   risk   manager   or   risk
management function. Indeed, the Risk Management Standard  (2002,  p.  2)  suggests  that  risk
responsibilities  should  be  assigned  throughout   the   organisation   with   each   manager   and
employee responsible for the management of risk as part  of  their  job  description.   A  firm  may
assign formal responsibility to personnel to conduct the process but such a process is  performed
as part of another department (Williams and Heins, 1985).  In such a case,  although  a  firm  has
no specialised department for risk or political risk, it still has some level of institutionalisation.
The creation of a standard institutionalisation model is almost  impossible  (Howell,  2001),  since
firms have different managerial structures and philosophies and indeed,  as  Williams  and  Heins
(1985)  have  noted,  the  optimal  method  of  risk  management  within  the  firm   is   debatable.
Although the Risk Management Standard (2002)  represents  best  practice  against  which  firms
can measure themselves, it is not intended to produce  a  prescriptive  approach  which  leads  to
“box ticking” or a certifiable process.  The rationale for  not  introducing  a  prescriptive  approach,
according to the Risk Management Standard (2002), is attributed to the many ways  of  achieving
the objectives of risk management and it would be impossible to try to set out all such  ways  in  a
single document.  Nonetheless, by meeting  the  various  component  parts  of  such  a  standard,
albeit in different ways, firms  can  report  their  compliance  with  the  standard.   In  addition,  the
diversity of potential political risk and the differences in firms’ exposure to risk  make  selection  of
an appropriate PRA and management strategies complex (Iankova and Katz, 2003).
3. Determinants of Institutionalisation
The micro-political risk literature emphasises that the impact of  political  risk  is  related  to  firm-
specific characteristics (Wilkin and Zonis, 2000; Kettis, 2004, Green,  2005;  Goriaev  and  Sonin,
2005) and that different multinational firms need to adopt their own political  risk-assessment  and
risk-mitigation strategies (Alon et al, 2006). That is to say, the nature of  political risk  assessment
is dependent on the nature of the risk exposure of the company.   The  literature  suggests  that  the
extent  to  which  international  firms  are  involved  in  PRA  is  therefore  correlated  with   many
organisational characteristics. These characteristics include: a) a firm’s  size  (Hashmi  and  Baker,
1988; Stapenhurst, 1992a; Kettis, 2004); and b) a  firm’s  degree  of  internationalisation  (Hashmi
and Baker, 1988; Hashmi and Guvenli, 1992).
1. A Firm’s Size
A firm’s size has an impact on both its capability to identify, assess and manage risk  and  also  its
vulnerability to risk.  From the capability perspective, Kobrin (1982, p. 22)  suggested  that  larger
firms  are  more  capable  of  engaging  ‘formally’  in  PRA,  while  smaller  firms  tend  to  utilise
‘simpler’ structures (i.e. PRA on an ad hoc basis).  By  way  of  illustration,  Stapenhurst  (1992b),
Kearns (1997) and Kettis  (2004)  reported  that  many  international  firms  considering  PRA  are
hindered by the initial and continuing high fixed costs of such a process.  In addition, PRA  results
in extra responsibilities for  top  management  who,  according  to  Albright  (2004),  do  not  have
‘much  time’  to  devote  to  search  systematically  for  the  information   needed.    Brink   (2004)
reiterated this point, arguing that the shortage of time which firms experience hinders a systematic
PRA.  Smaller firms are at a resource disadvantage when  compared  with  larger  firms  and  may,
therefore, not be able  to  invest  in  the  hiring  of  personnel  (Calof,  1994).   A  counterargument
however is proposed by  Gerry  (1996)  who  asserts  that  reducing  a  firm’s  size  facilitates  risk
management because managing a ‘big’ firm poses particular  difficulties.   Small  firms  can  often
react  to  the  market  more  quickly  (Fitzpatrick,  2005).   Small  firms  also  have  a   competitive
advantage via their cost structure, effective labour and material control  and  ease  of  delivery.   In
order to survive, Gerry (1996) concluded, smaller firms have to exploit their  potential  advantages
to be more competitive and efficient than larger firms.
The vulnerability perspective focuses on the extent to which firms are exposed to risk: large-sized
firms face different risks from those faced by  small-sized  firms.   For  example,  larger  firms  are
more likely to attract the attention of sovereign authorities (either positively or negatively) and this
is likely to affect their exposure to risk (Henisz, 2000). Smaller firms are much less likely to attract
attention.  Larger firms, which have a greater capability  to  exploit  a  host  country,  e.g.  in  large
infrastructure projects or the in the oil industry, are more vulnerable to some  political  risks,  such
as  expropriation  (Stosberg,  2005).   The   micro-political   risk   literature   suggests   that   firms
employing a large number of employees, are more likely to attract government  attention  (Wilkin,
2001).
The size of the firm also has an impact on the degree of bargaining power which firms are able to
exert in the local context.  Multinational companies are not necessarily passive observers of  their
host environment in which they invest, but in some cases are able to exert influence  (Alon  et  al,
2006; Frynas and Mellahi, 2003).  Oetzel (2005), in the context of Costa Rica, found that a  firm’s
size is an important determinant of its political exposure and that small firms are more  vulnerable
to some political risks than large firms.  For instance, larger firms may be more able to gain access
to local officials or lessen the impact of bureaucracy and  red  tape  (Oetzel,  2005).   However,  to
exert such influence requires effective and active management and  control  of  the  PRA  process,
thus necessitating a more structured and institutionalised PRA process.
The political risk literature therefore (e.g. Stapenhurst, 1992b; Kearns, 1997; Kettis,  2004)  tends
to  suggest  that  larger  firms  are   more   likely   to   institutionalise   PRA   than   smaller   ones.
Consequently, the following hypothesis is suggested in the context of Jordan:
1: There is a positive relationship between firm size, measured by its  assets  and  by
its number of employees, and the level of IPRA within the firm.
2. A Firm’s Degree of Internationalisation
Three  variables  are  used  frequently  in  the  risk   literature   to   measure   a   firm’s   degree   of
internationalisation:  years  in  international   business;   international   revenue;   and   number   of
operating countries.
The number of  years  in  international  business  has  been  investigated  by  Rice  and  Mahmoud
(1990), Wyper (1995), Pahud de Mortanges and Allers (1996), Keillor et al. (1997), Keillor  et  al.
(2005) and Oetzel (2005) and measures the extent of international experience.  On the one hand, it
could be expected that the greater the years the firm has been operating  in  international  business,
the  greater  the  likelihood  that  it  will  be  aware  of  risks  that  may  stem   from   the   political
environment, and so pay more attention to risk  assessment.   It  could  be  expected  also  that  the
fewer the years the firm has been operating in international business,  the  lower  is  the  likelihood
that the manager will be aware of risks that may stem  from  the  political  environment  and,  as  a
consequence,  have  a  less  formalised  structure  for   political   risk   assessment.    Nevertheless,
experience is also likely to reduce perceptions of risk over time (Kobrin, 1982;  Oetzel,  2005):  as
managers gain more experience of operating in diverse countries, they  may  become  desensitised
to risk,  and  so  they  may  pay  less  attention  to  risk  assessment.   In  contrast,  firms  with  less
international experience may be less  familiar  with  international  environments.   Therefore,  they
may pay more attention to political risk assessment (Green,  2005).   Interestingly,  Wyper  (1995)
found no significant correlation between the number of years of international  experience  and  the
institutionalisation of political risk assessment (PRA) within UK international firms.  Despite  this
finding, it is appropriate to  suggest  that  the  existence  of  such  a  correlation  may  be  found  in
different contexts.
The second variable is the percentage of revenue generated by  international  business  activities
(Hashmi and Baker, 1988).  The percentage of sales generated  abroad  also  has  been  used  by  a
number of empirical political risk studies, including Kobrin  (1982),  Rice  and  Mahmoud  (1990)
and Pahud de Mortanges and Allers (1996).  Total revenue, according to Kobrin (1982),  measures
the relative importance of international business activities to  international  firms.  Firms  that  rely
heavily on international revenue may pay due attention to assessing risks facing this revenue since
the consequence of losses may be severe.   Indeed,  Hashmi  and  Guvenli  (1992)  found  that  US
firms with high international  sales  (more  than  20.0  percent  of  the  total)  were  more  likely  to
institutionalise than firms with low international sales.  In this context, Green  (2005)  emphasised
that regardless of  a  firm’s  revenue  from  international  business,  today’s  business  environment
demands thorough PRA.
The third variable is the number of countries in which a firm operates (Blank et al. (1980);  Kobrin
(1982); Rice and Mahmoud (1990)).  This variable measures the diversity of a firm’s environment
(Kobrin, 1982).  According to Keillor et al. (1997), the first stage of  internationalisation  involves
only irregular export activities, followed, sequentially, by export  via  independent  agents,  export
via  established  international  sales  subsidiaries   and,   finally,   foreign   direct   investment   via
production / manufacturing  facilities.   Keillor  et  al.  (1997)  stated  that  by  gaining  experience
abroad and venturing into less familiar environments, firms begin to realise that political risk  may
be a problem.   According  to  Hashmi  and  Baker  (1988),  the  more  countries  in  which  a  firm
operates, the more likely it is to face constraints as a  consequence  of  political  variables,  and  so
pay more attention to risk assessment.
The    literature    therefore    suggests    two    possible    explanations    about    the     degree     of
internationalisation. The first  explanation  suggests  that  firms  which  are  ‘heavily’  involved  in
international business “have a great interest at stake”; as a  consequence  such  firms  “place  more
emphasis on assessing political risk than do other firms with  low  foreign  involvement”  (Hashmi
and Baker 1988, p. 193).  In a study of political risk mediation strategies by international  firms  in
Bulgaria,  Iankova  and  Katz  (2003)  concluded  that  firms  which  had   minimal   political   risk
exposure had little interest in risk assessment.  This view was confirmed by  Pahud  de  Mortanges
and Allers  (1996)  in  that  the  higher  the  potential  exposure  to  political  risk,  the  greater  the
tendency to institutionalise the assessment.  Thus, one can assume that firms with a higher  degree
of internationalisation are more likely to institutionalise.
The second explanation emphasises that operating in different international markets is one of the
main  strategies  available  to  firms  in  managing  risk  since  such  internationalisation   spreads
investments across markets with the aim of offsetting  gains  and  losses  (Chartered  Institute  of
Management Accountants, 2001).  Thus,  firms  with  high  international  involvement  can  offset
gains and losses since such firms spread investments across different markets. As  a  consequence,
such firms can be exposed to fewer risks and may place less emphasis on  PRA.  To  this  end,  the
following hypothesis is developed in the context of Jordan:
2: There is a positive relationship between the degree of  internationalisation  of  the
firm,  measured  by  its  years  of  experience  in  international   business,   by   its
percentage of revenue generated by international business  activities,  and  by  the
number of countries in which it operates, and the level of IPRA within the firm.
4. The Relationship Between Determinants
Studies concerned with the correlations between organisational variables and the adoption  of  risk
management practices (e.g. Stapenhurst, 1992a; Wyper, 1995) deal  with  organisational  variables
as independent of each other and  have  not  investigated  their  relative  importance.   It  has  been
noted that there is more than one possibility concerning the direction of the impact  of  the  degree
of internationalisation of the firm on  IPRA.   This  is  likely  then  to  weaken  the  impact  of  this
variable.  On the other hand, there are strong theoretical grounds, as outlined in  section  2.3.1,  for
assuming the relationship between size and institutionalisation.  It is predicted, therefore, that  size
will be the most important determinant of the institutionalisation of PRA.
Additionally, it is unlikely that the determinants are independent.   Firms  with  larger  total  assets
tend to have larger numbers of employees.  They are also likely to operate in more  countries  than
firms with fewer total assets.   Firms  operating  in  more  countries  generate  more  revenue  from
international activities and have more experience in international business.  That is,  to  the  extent
that a correlation between two variables is a function of a  third  intervening  variable,  one  would
expect the correlation to diminish when controlling  for  the  intervening  variable.   Consequently,
the following hypotheses can be formulated in the context of Jordan:
3: The size of the firm is the most important determinant of IPRA.
4: The determinants of IPRA are not independent of one another.
Figure 1 summarises the hypotheses to be tested:
Figure 1: Hypothesised determinants of IPRA
2.5 The Jordanian Context
Previous studies have focused on  Canadian  firms  (Rice  and  Mahmoud,  1990),  North  Atlantic
firms (Stapenhurst, 1992a), US firms (Stapenhurst, 1992b), UK firms  (Wyper,  1995)  and  Dutch
firms (Pahud  de  Mortanges  and  Allers,  1996).   However,  very  few  investigations  have  been
conducted into the topic in developing countries and specifically, the Middle East, a region whose
international business activities  are  growing,  but  which  is  characterised  by  a  high  degree  of
political volatility.
There have been a number of studies of the business environment  in  Jordan  and  other  Middle
Eastern countries which have alluded to or explicitly examined issues which are either associated
with or which contribute directly to political risk (e.g. Knowles, 2005;  El-Said  and  Becker,  2001;
Zeitun and Tian, 2007).  However, most of these studies have been undertaken  in  the  context  of
wider investigations of either factors influencing  inward  investment  in  the  countries  concerned
and/or of economic development, including  aid  (e.g.  Harms,  2002;  Chan  and  Gemayal,  2004;
Busse and Hefeker, 2007).
Some  of  these  studies  have  made  explicit  reference  to  political  risk  assessment,   often   via
construction of a political risk index (e.g. Hasan et al., 2003).   Others  have  dealt  with  the  close
links between political risk and financial risk (Abumustafa, 2007; Zaher, 2007; Bilson et al 2002).
However, none of these studies has examined the institutionalisation of  political  risk  assessment
(IPRA) or the factors influencing it – either in Jordan or in the Middle East as a whole.
This  study  is  the  first  to  focus  on  political  risk   assessment   in   publicly   traded   Jordanian
international firms, in any context. The following are key features of its institutional environment
Jordan is a small (population 6 million), landlocked, country with  few  natural  resources.  It  also
depends on  external  sources  for  the  majority  of  its  energy  requirements,  unlike  some  of  its
neighbours. Both poverty and a high rate of unemployment, at least in relation to the  countries  in
which earlier PRA studies have been  undertaken,  are   significant  features  of  its  economic  and
social fabric. Jordan is a constitutional monarchy with the King also being the Executive  Head  of
Government. The Parliament, which is elected every four years, exercises mainly a  scrutiny  role.
Jordan’s economic difficulties, growing population and relatively open political environment (in a
Middle  East  context)  have  led  to  the  growth  of  a  number  of  small   political   parties.   (US
Department of State, 2008). Nevertheless the political scene remains relatively  stable  in  spite  of
sporadic protests, for example relating to the lifting of fuel subsidies in February  2008.  (Business
Monitor International , 2008).
The political risks facing Jordanian firms are therefore partly  a  reflection  of  the  wider  political
risks facing all firms in the Middle East  region  e.g.  terrorism  and  economic  difficulties  arising
from underdevelopment, especially since Jordanian international firms tend to  operate  mainly  in
Middle Eastern  markets.  Jordan-  specific  political  risks  have  their  origins  in  economics  e.g.
natural resource limitations rather than in politics  per  se.   Although  levels  of  political  risk  are
lower in Jordan  than  in  many  other  Middle  East  countries,  the  country  is  potentially  highly
vulnerable to external shocks, given its size and resource endowment.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
To test the hypotheses, a survey strategy was adopted.  In line with  previous  studies  in  the  field
(Kobrin et al., 1980; Kennedy, 1988; Rice and Mahmoud, 1990; Stapenhurst, 1992a; Subramanian
et al. 1993; Pahud de Mortanges  and  Allers,  1986;  Wyper,  1995;  Demirbag  and  Gunes  2000;
Hood and  Nawaz,  2004),  a  self-administered  questionnaire  was  the  principal  data  collection
method used.
The sampling frame used was the group of international companies listed  on  the  Amman  Stock
Exchange for the year 2004.   The  list  can  be  considered  to  equate  to  the  total  population  of
Jordanian  international  firms  which  are  based  in  Jordan  (Amman   Stock   Exchange,   2004).
Previous research (Oetzel, 2005) found that managers at  subsidiary  level  do  not  engage  in  risk
assessment.  Thus  this  study  is  limited  to  the  Jordanian  firms’  headquarters  and  it  excludes
subsidiaries and  plants.   Subsidiaries  of  firms  of  other  nationalities,  operating  in  Jordan,  are
excluded to ensure the  country-specific  nature  of  the  study.   75.3  percent  of  countries  where
Jordanian firms operate are Arabian countries located in the Middle East.
Although English is an official language in Jordan and is  spoken  widely,  the  questionnaire  was
written in both English and Arabic.  To overcome issues  of  social  desirability  respondents  were
asked to tick the same response boxes irrespective of  the  language  in  which  they  had  read  the
questions.
The questionnaire was delivered by hand to the population of the sampling frame (79 firms).  The
active response rate (excluding ineligible and unreachable respondents) was  59.4%.   Of  the  44
usable responses, 20 (43.2%) were from industrial firms, 12 (29.7%) were from the banking sector
and 12 (23%) were from  service  firms.   The  Chi-square  test  was  used  to  test  for  bias  in  the
sample.  The output  of  the  Chi-square  statistic  indicated  no  statistically  significant  difference
between respondents and non-respondents with respect to industry category (X2 = 2.552, p=0.279,
2 sided) and to a firm’s total assets (X2 = 5.583, p = 0.061, 2 sided).  The sample, is representative
of the population therefore and the findings can be generalised to the entire population.
5. Measures
1. Size
Two  variables  were  used  to  measure  the  size  of  the  organisation:  the  total  assets  in  US  $
(ASSETS) and number of employees in the firm (EMPLOY).  Data were collected from published
sources on the population of Jordanian international firms (listed on the Amman Stock Exchange).
  The  total  assets  for  Jordanian  international  firms  ranged  from  US$  7.466  million  to   US$
20,513.857 million.  The number of employees ranged from 68 to 6195 (see Figure  2).   For  each
variable, the firms were placed in order of size and divided into three equal  groups  (trichotomous
method)  which  were  labelled  small-,  medium-  and  large-sized  firms.   Figure   3   shows   the
classification of firm size by total assets and  number  of  employees.   These  classifications  were
used subsequently to categorise firms from the survey sample.
|                    |Valid N = 75 firms                             |
|Size                |                                               |
|                    |Minimum  |Maximum   |Mean   |Median  |SD       |
|Assets (US $        |7.466    |20,513.857|483.136|29.013  |2,382.321|
|million)            |         |          |       |        |         |
|Employees           |68       |6195      |517.7  |213     |941.68   |
Figure 2: A firm’s size in terms of total assets and number of employees
•  Analysis  of  data  obtained  from:  Jordanian  Shareholding   Companies’   Guide   /
Amman Stock Exchange for the year 2004; the Jordanian  Export  Development  and
Commercial Centres Corporation  (JEDCO)  publishes  data  (i.e.  web  sites,  annual
reports) on a firm-by-firm basis.
|Variables of size          |Size categories                      |
|                           |Small      |Medium        |Large     |
|Total assets US $ (million)|? 17.3     |17.4 - 45.6   |? 45.7    |
|Number of employees        |? 186      |187 - 312     |? 313     |
Figure 3: Classification of a firm’s size by total assets and number of employees
3.1.2 Degree of Internationalisation
Three indicators of degree  of  internationalisation  were  used:  number  of  years  in  international
business  (YEARS),  international  revenue  (REVENUE)  and   number   of   operating   countries
(COUNTRY).
YEARS was used by Rice and Mahmoud (1990), Wyper (1995), Pahud de  Mortanges  and  Allers
(1996),  Keillor  et  al.  (1997),  Keillor  et  al.  (2005)  and  Oetzel  (2005).   Following  Pahud  de
Mortanges  and  Allers  (1996),  the  Jordanian  firms  are  classified  into  three  categories:   low-
internationalised firms have less than ten years’ experience in international business, whereas high-
internationalised firms have more than twenty-six years’ experience.    Allocating  the  responding
firms to YEARS reveals that fifteen out  of  forty-three  firms  (34.9%)  are  low-internationalised,
seventeen  firms  (39.5%)  are  medium-internationalised  and  eleven  firms   (25.6%)   are   high-
internationalised.
Whilst a number of political risk studies have measured internationalisation according to the sales
generated abroad (Kobrin, 1982; Hashmi and Baker, 1988; Rice and Mahmoud,  1990;  Pahud  de
Mortanges and Allers, 1996), this research uses international  revenue  (REVENUE).   Revenue  is
suitable as it indicates the extent to which firms rely on international business activities,  which  in
turn indicates the importance of  such  activities  to  a  firm.   Jordanian  firms  in  this  study  were
classified into  three  main  categories  regarding  their  REVENUE.   Low-internationalised  firms
generate less than 10.0 percent of their revenue from international business activities, whereas  the
percentage for  high-internationalised  firms  is  more  than  26.0  percent.   Allocating  responding
firms according to REVENUE reveals that seventeen out  of  forty-three  firms  (39.5%)  are  low-
internationalised, ten firms (23.3%) are medium-internationalised and  sixteen  firms  (37.2%)  are
high-internationalised.
The third variable is the number of countries in which a  firm  operates  (COUNTRY)  as  used  by
Blank et al. (1980), Kobrin (1982) and Rice and Mahmoud (1990). This variable, as suggested  by
Kobrin (1982), measures the diversity of a firm’s environment.    Following  the  classification  by
Blank et al. (1980); Kobrin  (1982)  and  Rice  and  Mahmoud  (1990),  Jordanian  publicly  traded
firms are classified into three main categories with regard to  COUNTRY.   Low-internationalised
firms have such facilities in fewer than five countries, whereas  high-internationalised  firms  have
facilities  in  more  than  eleven  countries.   Allocating  the  responding  firms  according  to  their
number of operating countries reveals  that  forty-three  firms  (46.5%)  are  low  internationalised,
nine firms (20.9%) are medium  internationalised  and  fourteen  firms  are  high  internationalised
(32.6%) .
3.1.3 Institutionalisation of Political Risk Assessment (IPRA)
This research conceptualises IPRA as a bipolar continuum from  ‘less  institutionalised’  to  ‘more
institutionalised’.  Operationally, in order to establish a rank order of firms, a  three-stage  process
was adopted based on  the  following  indicators:  a)  responsibility  assignment;  b)  frequency  of
conducting the assessment; and c) risk assessment techniques.
The allocation of responsibility for PRA is considered to be a minimum indicator of IPRA  (Blank
et al., 1980;  Kobrin,  1982).   Therefore,  in  the  first  stage,  respondents  were  asked  to  choose
between three levels of responsibility assignment: (a) no formal  assignment  of  responsibility  for
an individual(s) for PRA nor any effort made by any individual in the firm to do so; (b) no  formal
responsibility for an individual but related activities are conducted by various individuals;  (c)  the
firm assigns formal responsibility for an individual(s)  to  evaluate  the  potential  risks  associated
with the firm’s international business activities.  Firms in each response category were coded  ‘not
institutionalised’, ‘less institutionalised’ and ‘more institutionalised’ respectively.
The allocation of firms on the basis the assignment of responsibility is shown in Figure 4.
|Classification        |Valid N = 43 firms             |
|                      |Number of firms|Percentage     |
|Non-institutionalised |5              |11.6           |
|Less institutionalised|23             |53.5           |
|More institutionalised|15             |34.9           |
|Total                 |43             |100            |
Figure 4: Risk assessment responsibilities within Jordanian firms
Source:     Analysis of questionnaire data.
In the second stage, firms  in  the  categories  ‘less-institutionalised’  and  ‘more  institutionalised’
were ordered independently on the basis of the frequency of  conducting  the  assessment  process.
(The ‘non-institutionalised’ category could not be ordered using either this  indicator  or  the  third
indicator as, by definition, these firms are not involved in such practices.)  Firms were  asked  how
frequently  they  conducted  political  risk  assessment.   The   response   categories   were:   never,
occasionally, yearly, quarterly and day-to-day.   The more frequently firms conducted assessment,
the greater the degree of IPRA and the less frequently assessment  was  conducted,  the  lower  the
degree of IRPA.
In the third stage, respondents were asked to  identify  which  PRA  techniques  their  firms  used
from  a  literature-derived  list  (judgement  and  intuition   of   manger,   expert   opinion,   Delphi
technique, standardised checklist, scenario development and quantitative techniques).   Firms  that
used both qualitative and quantitative techniques were rated as  more  institutionalised  than  those
firms which used qualitative techniques alone.   The  use  of  these  techniques  was  then  used  to
order the firms within the groupings identified in stage 2.
Using the procedures described above, a rank order of firms was generated which placed them  on
a continuum of IRPA from ‘less institutionalised’ to ‘more institutionalised’.
6. Statistical analysis
Analysis of the outputs of a Normal Quantiles-Quantiles chart in the current sample  demonstrated
that certain variables were not normally distributed. As normally distributed  data  are  one  of  the
basic  underlying  assumptions  for  the  use  of  parametric  statistics  (Field,  2000),  it   was   not
appropriate  to  use  parametric  statistics.    The   decision   was   made   therefore   to   use   more
conservative non-parametric statistics.     Non-parametric  statistics  are  less  powerful  than  their
parametric counterparts in that if there is a significant effect in data, then a parametric test is  more
likely to detect it than a non-parametric one.  There is therefore an increased chance of  a  Type  II
error (i.e.  accepting  the  null  hypothesis  when  the  alternate  hypothesis  is  true).   Nonetheless,
employing  non-parametric  statistics  with  valid  assumptions  is  methodologically  ‘safer’   than
employing ‘robust’ statistics with invalid or violated assumptions  (Hollander  and  Wolfe,  1999).
Furthermore, the ‘robustness’ of using  a  particular  statistic  lies  in  whether  or  not  a  statistic’s
assumptions are met; if so, the statistic yields generally valid results (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001). 
3. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
1. Determinants of Institutionalisation
The output of a Kruskal-Wallis test indicated a statistically significant  difference  in  the  level  of
institutionalisation across the three  categories  of  a  firm’s  total  assets  (X²  =  6.221,  p  <  0.05)
(Figure 5).  Accordingly,  the  hypothesis  of  statistically  significant  differences  in  the  level  of
institutionalisation across the ASSETS categories was accepted. An inspection of  the  mean  rank
for the ASSETS categories indicates that larger firms had  the  highest  institutionalisation  scores,
with the smaller category reporting the lowest (mean rank 28.29 versus mean rank 16.57).
|ASSETS                        |Mean rank |Kruskal-Wallis test|
|                              |          |valid N = 43 firms |
|Categories |N    |Total assets |          |                   |
|           |     |a            |          |                   |
|Small      |14   |? 17.3       |16.57     |X² = 6.221         |
|           |     |             |          |p = 0.045          |
|           |     |             |          |(df = 2)           |
|Medium     |15   |17.4 – 45.6  |21.20     |                   |
|Large      |14   |? 45.7       |28.29     |                   |
Figure 5: A firm’s total assets and the level of institutionalisation
Note a:  Total assets in US $ million.
• Analysis of questionnaire data.
With  regard  to  the  second  measure  of  size,  EMPLOY,   the  output  of  a  Kruskal-Wallis  test
indicated no statistically significant difference in the level of  institutionalisation  across  the  three
categories of a firm’s number of employees: EMPLOY (X² = 1.868, p  >  0.05)  (Figure  6).  Thus,
the hypothesis of statistically significant differences across the EMPLOY categories was rejected.
|EMPLOY                            |Mean rank  |Kruskal-Wallis    |
|                                  |           |test              |
|                                  |           |valid N = 43 firms|
|Categories|N   |Number of         |           |                  |
|          |    |employees         |           |                  |
|Small     |9   |? 186             |17.00      |X² = 1.868        |
|          |    |                  |           |p = 0.393         |
|          |    |                  |           |(df = 2)          |
|Medium    |15  |187 - 312         |22.77      |                  |
|Large     |19  |? 313             |23.76      |                  |
Figure 6: A firm’s number of employees and the level of institutionalisation
• Analysis of questionnaire data.
The output of a Kruskal-Wallis test indicated no statistically significant difference in  the  level  of
institutionalisation across the three categories of a firm’s international experience (X² = 3.067, p >
0.05) (Figure 7). Thus, the hypothesis of a statistically significant  difference  across  the  YEARS
categories was rejected.
|YEARS                             |Mean rank|Kruskal-Wallis test|
|                                  |         |                   |
|                                  |         |valid N = 43 firms |
|Categories|N    |Number of years  |         |                   |
|Low       |15   |? 10             |17.87    |X² = 3.067         |
|          |     |                 |         |p = 0.216          |
|          |     |                 |         |(df = 2)           |
|Medium    |17   |11 - 25          |22.79    |                   |
|High      |11   |? 26             |26.41    |                   |
Figure 7: A firm’s number of years in international business activities and the level of
institutionalisation
• Analysis of questionnaire data.
There was a statistically significant difference in the level of  institutionalisation  across  the  three
categories of a firm’s international revenue: REVENUE (X² =  9.183,  p  <  0.05)  (Figure  8).  An
inspection of the mean rank for  the  REVENUE  categories  indicates  that  high-internationalised
firms had the highest  institutionalisation  scores,  with  the  lower  category  reporting  the  lowest
(mean  rank  27.97  versus  15.06).   Consequently,   the   hypothesis   of   statistically   significant
differences across the REVENUE categories was accepted.
|REVENUE                        |Mean ranks |Kruskal-Wallis test|
|                               |           |                   |
|                               |           |valid N = 43 firms |
|Categories  |N    |Classificatio|           |                   |
|            |     |n b          |           |                   |
|Low         |17   |? 10 %       |15.06      |X² = 9.183         |
|            |     |             |           |p = 0.010          |
|            |     |             |           |(df = 2)           |
|Medium      |10   |11 % - 25 %  |24.25      |                   |
|High        |16   |? 26 %       |27.97      |                   |
Figure 8: A firm’s international revenue and the level of institutionalisation
Note b: The percentage of revenue generated by international business activities.
• Analysis of questionnaire data.
In  the  case  of  the  third  measure  of  internationalisation,  there  was  a  statistically   significant
difference in the level of institutionalisation  across  the  three  categories  of  a  firm’s  number  of
interested countries: COUNTRY (X² = 15.302, p < 0.01) (Figure 9).  An  inspection  of  the  mean
rank for the COUNTRY  categories  indicates  that  high-internationalised  firms  had  the  highest
institutionalisation scores, with the lower category reporting the lowest (mean ranks  31.96  versus
14.90).  Consequently,  the  hypothesis  of  a  statistically  significant  difference   in   the   ordinal
institutionalisation variable across the three COUNTRY categories was accepted.
|COUNTRY                              |Mean   |Kruskal-Wallis test|
|                                     |ranks  |valid N = 43 firms |
|Categories|N    |Number of countries|       |                   |
|          |     |c                  |       |                   |
|Low       |20   |? 5                |14.90  |X² = 15.302        |
|          |     |                   |       |p = 0.01           |
|          |     |                   |       |(df = 2)           |
|Medium    |9    |6 - 10             |22.28  |                   |
|High      |14   |? 11               |31.96  |                   |
Figure 9: A firm’s number of countries and the level of institutionalisation
Note c:  Number of countries in which a firm operates.
• Analysis of questionnaire data.
High-internationalised firms, in terms of the number  of  operating  countries,  are  more  likely  to
institutionalise than medium-internationalised firms and medium-internationalised firms are  more
likely to institutionalise than low-internationalised firms. As none of the previous  PRA  empirical
studies have related institutionalisation to a firm’s number of operating countries, no  comparisons
with  these  findings  can  be  made.  Nevertheless,  Hashmi  and  Baker   (1988)   and   Pahud   de
Mortanges and Allers (1996) proposed that the  more  countries  in  which  the  firm  operates,  the
more likely the firm is to face constraints as a consequence of political variables, and so pay  more
attention to risk assessment. This proposition seems to  be  the  case  in  the  context  of  Jordanian
firms.
2.  Correlation between determinants
Three out of five potential determinants of institutionalisation are significant: a firm’s  total  assets
in US $ million (ASSETS), the number of countries in which  a  firm  has  facilities  (COUNTRY)
and  a  firm’s  revenue  from  international  business   activities   (REVENUE).   The   rank   order
correlation coefficients (all variables were measured on an ordinal  scale)  between  each  of  these
determinants and the level of institutionalisation is shown in  Figure  10.  The  outputs  of  the  test
revealed that COUNTRY was first (Kendall’s  Tau  =  0.424,  p  <  0.01,  2-tailed),  ASSETS  was
second (Kendall’s Tau = 0.294, p < 0.01, 2-tailed), REVENUE was third (Kendall’s Tau =  0.289,
p < 0.05, 2-tailed).  Neither YEARS and EMPLOY were significant.
|Determinants   |Kendall’s Tau (2-tailed)                     |
|               |Coefficient  |Significance           |Valid N |
|COUNTRY        |r = 0.424    |0.01 (2-tailed)        |43      |
|ASSETS         |r = 0.294    |0.01 (2-tailed)        |43      |
|REVENUE        |r = 0.289    |0.05 (2-tailed)        |43      |
|EMPLOY         |r = 0.278    |Not significant        |43      |
|               |             |(2-tailed)             |        |
|YEARS          |r = 0.206    |Not significant        |43      |
|               |             |(2-tailed)             |        |
Figure 10: Relative importance of determinants of institutionalisation (Kendall’s Tau)
• Analysis of questionnaire data.
Figure  11  shows  the  inter-correlations   between   the   significant   determinants.    There   were
significant positive correlations between the determinants,  COUNTRY  and  ASSETS  (Kendall’s
Tau = 0.231, p < 0.05, 2-tailed) and COUNTRY  and  REVENUE  (Kendall’s  Tau  =  0.252,  p  <
0.05, 2-tailed).
|Determinants |Kendall’s Tau (2-tailed)          |
|             |ASSETS           |REVENUE          |
|ASSETS       |—                |r = 0.127, p =   |
|             |                 |0.249            |
|COUNTRY      |r = 0.231, p =   |r = 0.252, p =   |
|             |0.034            |0.026            |
Figure 11: Correlations among determinants
• Analysis of questionnaire data.
In order test for a positive association between two variables and a third variable, Kendall’s partial
correlation coefficient was used. The first consideration is the  relationship  between  the  level  of
institutionalisation (INSTITUT) and the degree of  internationalisation  as  measured  via  the  two
variables: COUNTRY and REVENUE. The correlation between COUNTRY and REVENUE was
significant (Kendall’s Tau = 0.252, p < 0.05, 2-tailed) and  the  correlations  between  COUNTRY
and INSTITUT (Kendall’s  Tau  =  0.424,  p  <  0.01,  2-tailed)  and  REVENUE  and  INSTITUT
(Kendall’s  Tau  =  0.289,  p  <  0.05,  2-tailed)  were  also  significant.  The  correlation   between
INSTITUT  and  REVENUE,  controlling  for  COUNTRY,  was  compared  with  the  correlation
between INSTITUT and COUNTRY, controlling for REVENUE (Figure 12). The  Kendall’s  Tau
for INSTITUT and REVENUE, fell to 28.0 percent of its value when controlling  for  COUNTRY
(Kendall’s  Tau  0.289  versus  Kendall’s  partial  correlation  0.208).   The   degeneration   of   the
correlation between INSTITUT and COUNTRY, on the other hand, was only  10.6  percent  when
controlling for REVENUE (Kendall’s Tau 0.424 versus  Kendall’s  partial  correlation  0.379).  Of
the two measures  of  internationalisation,  COUNTRY  was  the  most  important  determinant  of
INSTITUT.
|Kendall’s Tau          |Value    |Controllin|Kendall’s  |Degeneration|
|correlation between:   |         |g for     |partial    |in value %  |
|                       |         |          |value      |            |
|INSTITUT and COUNTRY   |r = 0.424|          |0.383      |9.0         |
|                       |         |ASSETS    |           |            |
|                       |p < 0.01 |          |           |            |
|                       |         |REVENUE   |0.379      |10.6        |
|INSTITUT and REVENUE   |r = 0.289|          |0.208      |28.0        |
|                       |         |COUNTRY   |           |            |
|                       |p < 0.05 |          |           |            |
|INSTITUT and ASSETS    |r = 0.294|          |0.222      |24.4        |
|                       |         |COUNTRY   |           |            |
|                       |p < 0.05 |          |           |            |
Figure 12: Correlations among the determinants of institutionalisation (Kendall’s Partial correlation)
• Analysis of questionnaire data.
The second consideration is the correlation between  COUNTRY,  ASSETS  and  INSTITUT.  As
shown in Figure 11, the following variables are correlated significantly: COUNTRY and ASSETS
(Kendall’s Tau = 0.231, p < 0.05, 2-tailed); INSTITUT and COUNTRY (Kendall’s Tau = 0.424, p
< 0.01, 2-tailed);  INSTITUT  and  ASSETS  (Kendall’s  Tau  =  0.294,  p  <  0.05,  2-tailed).  The
correlation between INSTITUT and ASSETS, controlling for COUNTRY, was compared with the
correlation between INSTITUT and COUNTRY, controlling for ASSETS. The Kendall’s Tau  for
INSTITUT  and  ASSETS  fell  to  24.4  percent  of  its  value  when  controlling  for  COUNTRY
(Kendall’s  Tau  0.294  versus  Kendall’s  partial  correlation  0.222).   On   the   other   hand,   the
degeneration of the correlation between INSTITUT and COUNTRY was  only  9.0  percent  when
controlling  for  ASSETS  (Kendall’s  Tau  0.424  versus   Kendall’s   partial   correlation   0.383).
Therefore COUNTRY was the most important determinant of INSTITUT.
4. DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to contribute to  the  development  of  IPRA  theory  by  examining  and
explaining  IPRA  in  publicly  quoted  Jordanian  companies.   The  study  contributes   to   theory
development  in  three  areas:  conceptual  domain  of  IPRA;  determinants   of   IPRA;   and   the
relationship between the determinants of IPRA.
Conceptual domain of IPRA
The first contribution to the literature of this study is that it conceptualises and measures IPRA  on
the basis of three indicators (responsibility assignment, frequency of conducting  assessments  and
risk assessment technique) rather than a single indicator.  One advantage of this approach is that at
the conceptual level it better captures the construct of IPRA by representing it as  a  continuum  of
arrangements within an organisation instead of a binary concept.  This  study  places  firms  into  a
rank order and subsequently into ordinal groups.  This has  the  further  advantage  that  the  IPRA
construct can then be investigated statistically.  Therefore, this work extends, in  this  context,  the
work of earlier studies (e.g. Hashmi and Guvenli, 1992; Pahud de Mortanges and Allers, 1996).
Determinants of IPRA
The second contribution of the study is  to  identify  and  investigate  empirically  determinants  of
institutionalisation  by  examining  firm  specific  characteristics.   A  firm-specific  characteristics
framework  is  used  to  investigate  two  principal  determinants  of  IPRA:  size   and   degree   of
internationalisation.  The study found support for the hypothesis that the size of the organisation is
positively related to IPRA, when measured by the firm’s total  assets  (ASSETS),  but  not  by  the
firm’s number of employees (EMPLOYEES).  (The study did  find  however  that  the  number  of
employees and its total assets are correlated).  Therefore, in terms of total assets,  larger  firms  are
more likely to institutionalise their PRA than medium sized and smaller firms.
These findings support those of Stapenhurst (1992b)  who  found  that  larger  firms  tended  to  be
more likely to have formal PRA units than smaller ones.  Kobrin  (1982,  p22)  argued  that  larger
firms tend to use more ‘complex structures’ because they have greater resources to support such  a
structure.  Stapenhurst (1992b) contended that the high  initial  and  fixed  costs  of  environmental
scanning hindered the adoption of PRA.  Likewise, Kettis (2004) explained the lack of  systematic
PRA in Swedish firms as being due to the cost of having ‘in-house’ PRA  exceeding  the  benefits.
There is a developing consensus in the literature therefore that it is  primarily  larger  firms  which
have the resources and capabilities to embed the process of PRA within their structures.
The study  also  investigated  the  degree  of  internationalisation  of  PRA  in  the  context  of  the
Jordanian sample.  Degree of internationalisation was measured by three  indicators:  number  of
years in international business (YEARS), revenue from  international  business  (REVENUE)  and
number of countries in which the firm operates (COUNTRY).  In line with the findings  of  Wyper
(1995), in the context of UK firms, the number of years in international business was found  to  be
not significant.  It is  arguable  that  it  is  the  nature  of  international  experience  rather  than  the
quantity of that experience which is important.   (For  example,  ten  years  experience  in  the  UK
market before 2003 would be markedly different from one year’s experience in the Iraqi market in
2003).
Statistical support was found however for the  two  other  indicators  of  internationalisation.   The
level of revenue derived from international business (REVENUE) was positively related  to  IPRA
suggesting that the higher the level of revenue generated by  international  business  activities,  the
more likely the firm is to institutionalise its PRA.   This finding in the Jordanian context is  in  line
with the finding of Hashmi and Baker (1988) that US firms which  generated  more  than  20%  of
their sales from international business activities  were  more  likely  to  institutionalise  their  PRA
than those with less than 20%.
Statistically significant differences in the level of institutionalisation  were  also  found  across  the
three categories of a firm’s number of countries of operation (COUNTRY).  This variable  has  not
been studied previously and therefore no direct comparisons with earlier literature  can  be  made.
However, Hashmi and Baker (1988) and Pahud de Mortanges and Allers  (1996)  do  propose  that
the more countries in  which  the  firm  operates,  the  more  likely  it  is  to  face  constraints  as  a
consequence of political variables and so is more likely to pay attention to PRA.   The  number  of
countries in which a firm operates therefore increases its  exposure  to  political  risk  and  so  it  is
more likely to pay attention to political risk (Hashmi and  Baker,  1988;  Howell,  2001;  Stosberg,
2005).
Additionally, the greater the number of  countries  in  which  a  firm  operates  in,  the  greater  the
complexity of the task of PRA.  Alon et al. (2006) reinforce the point that each nation needs to  be
looked at as a unique operating  environment  and  therefore  merits  its  own  individual  analysis.
Therefore, the  increase  in  the  number  of  countries  in  which  the  firm  operates  increases  the
complexity of PRA and  ad  hoc  and  informal  assessment  of  political  risk  may  become  more
difficult and unmanageable  within  the  firm.   In  such  circumstances,  firms  are  more  likely  to
embed structures and systems to assess political risk within the firm.
The investment destinations in this sample were predominantly other Arab countries.   This  might
serve to increase the exposure of PRA for Jordanian international companies because the nature of
hazards (e.g. terrorism, coup d’etats, insurrection)  have  the  potential  to  have  extremely  severe
consequences.  On the other hand, the relative  geographic  and  cultural  similarities  between  the
countries in the region might in fact reduce complexity due to a shared understanding  of  political
and economic contexts.
Although no direct comparisons can be made with other studies, it is useful  to  speculate  whether
the relationship between IPRA and internationalisation might be strengthened or  lessened  by  the
overall  the  Middle  Eastern  context  of  this  study  in  comparison   with   other,   say,   Western
environments.
Relationship between determinants
In addition to identifying  the  determinants  of  IPRA,  this  study  also  contributes  to  theory  by
establishing the relative importance of the determinants  of  IPRA.   It  was  hypothesised  that  the
size of the organisation would be the foremost determinant  of  IPRA.   However,  this  hypothesis
was not supported and the study revealed that in  fact  the  number  of  countries  (COUNTRY)  in
which a firm operated was the strongest determinant, followed by its  total  assets  (ASSETS)  and
then  the  revenue  derived  from   international   business   (REVENUE).    Moreover,   the   study
developed theoretical knowledge in the field by establishing that the determinants  of  IPRA  were
not independent.
6.  CONCLUSIONS
This paper offers some important insights into the institutionalisation of political risk  assessment.
In particular, it conceptualises and measures IPRA on the basis of three indicators, rather than just
one.  It also presents IPRA as a continuum of arrangements, rather  than  as  a  binary  concept.   It
also uses a firm specific characteristics framework to investigate at two principal  determinants  of
IPRA:  size  and  degree  of  internationalisation.  In  addition,  it  contributes   to   knowledge   by
establishing the relative importance of the determinants of IPRA.
This study is the first to attempt to examine IPRA empirically in Jordan or indeed  in  any  Middle
East country.  It is a region of growing economic and geo-political significance and therefore  it  is
important that the behaviour of firms in this region is  better  understood.   Jordanian  international
firms, in line with the international business literature, have expanded into business  environments
which are culturally and geographically closest to their home country i.e.  into  other  Middle  East
countries.
Although the research does fill some of the major theoretical gaps in the previous  literature,  there
are limitations which arise from the sample size.   The  number  of  firms  in  the  sample  (n=  44)
precludes  further  types  of  analysis  (for  example,  a  subdivision  into  industry   classification).
Secondly, the study  uses  non-parametric  statistics  rather  than  their  more  powerful  parametric
counterparts.  If the  sample  size  of  Jordanian  international  firms  had  been  larger,  the  use  of
parametric statistics would have been possible.
There remains a relatively limited amount of empirical  work  concerning  IPRA  in  organisations
and it is important to examine state-of-the-art political risks to  determine  where  the  field  stands
today and the trends which are emerging (Hood and Nawaz, 2004; Kettis, 2004).  There is  a  need
to undertake to develop a more robust theoretical understanding of the influences  on  the  level  of
IPRA in firms.  Further research might  identify,  for  example,  the  differential  impact  of  micro
political risks on a firm’s IPRA (Alon et al, 2006).  It might  also  address  cross-national  designs.
It is notable that the majority  of  studies,  including  this  one,  have  been  conducted  in  a  single
country context.  Multi-country studies using a common methodology might help to explain cross-
national differences within a firm-specific characteristics framework.  In this context  it  would  be
interesting to investigate inward investment in Jordan by other Middle East firms.
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Appendix A – Questionnaire items
Firm profile
1. How much are the firms’ total assets (in Jordanian Dinar) in the last fiscal year.
2. How many employees does your firm currently employ
3. How many years has your firm been involved in international business activities
4. In how  many  countries  does  your  firm  have  facilities  such  as  representative  offices,
subsidiaries, branches, affiliates, joint ventures and licensing / franchise agreements?
5. What percentage of the previous  fiscal  year’s  revenues  was  attributed  to  international
business activities
Institutionalisation of political risk assessment
6.  In  the  process  of  analysing  and  evaluating  the   potential   risks   associated   with   the   firms’
international business activities such as importing and /or exporting  goods  and  services  and  /  or
producing goods and services in countries other than Jordan, please tick the box that best describes
your firm.
a) The firm has never assigned formal responsibility for an  individual(s)  to  analyse  and
evaluate the potential risks associated with the firm’s international  business  activities
NOR is any effort made by any individual in the firm to do so.
b) The firm has never assigned formal responsibility for an  individual(s)  to  analyse  and
evaluate the potential risks associated with the firm’s international  business  activities
BUT the related activities are conducted by various individuals.
c) The firm assigns formal responsibility for an individual(s) to analyse and  evaluate  the
potential risks associated with the firm’s international business activities.
(Respondents who did not tick a) above  were  not  required  to  complete  the  remainder  of  the
questionnaire.)
The practices of political risk assessment
7. In conducting the  process  of  political  risk  assessment,  please  tick  the  box  that  best
describes your firm’s behaviour (tick one box only).
a. The firm conducts such a process internally; using the firm’s personnel only
b. The firm conducts such a process external; using external  specialised  institutions
only
c. The firm conducts such a process internally as well as externally
8. How often is the process  of  political  risk  assessment  conducted  (Never,  occasionally,
yearly, quarterly, day to day)
9. In the  process  of  conducting  the  political  risk  assessment,  different  risk  assessment
techniques  are  available   for   firms.    Among   the   following,   please   indicate   which
technique(s)  you  use  and  to  what  extent  such  a  technique(s)   is/are   successful   in
analysing risks (0 = not used, 1 = used with no success, 2= used with a moderate  degree
of success, 3 = used with a great deal of success).
a. Judgement and intuition of manager: conducting the assessment intuitively relying
 on the competence of the firm’s manager(s)
b. Expert opinion: conducting the assessment by an outside consultant who is expert
on a certain country or area.
c.  Delphi  technique:  conducting   assessment   by   a   group   of   experts,   initially
independently and subsequently by consensus
d. Standardised checklist: systematically reviewing items in a  list  regarding  political
risks
e. Scenario development: developing a number of  possible  scenarios  for  a  certain
country
f. Quantitative techniques: assessing risk by any analytical procedure that  is  based
on data that can theoretically lend itself to  statistical  or  mathematical  operations
(e.g. regression analysis)
---------------------------------------
[1] We are grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this point.
